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FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS USING PPPs:  
THE CASE OF THE 4th GENERATION OF HIGHWAYS IN COLOMBIA 
Abstract 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become in a well-know model that is use around the 
globe for infrastructure development, especially for highways construction and operation. As 
the private sector becomes responsible for the availability and quality of the infrastructure, 
there are efficiencies and innovations expected that make the PPP model more suitable than 
traditional public procurement. Besides, PPPs are expected to evoke performance-based 
contracting, more solid regulation and are a financing alternative when there are budgetary 
fiscal constrains. The 4th Generation of highways is an ambitious PPP program developed by 
the Colombian government to build more than 30 highways in the country in the next 5 years, 
which contemplates investment of more than EUR 20 billion. This paper aims to analyze in 
detail the 4G program experience, to assess strengths and weaknesses of the Colombian 
model that could become on learning points for future PPP projects on emerging markets. 
Several findings on the lack of financing capacity by private partners, barriers on lending and 
immaturity of the institutional market, summed up to particular risks and lack of a more 
accurate planning, have made evident the dependency on public resources. Then, the question 
arise about the convenience of the PPP model and consideration of other alternatives for the 
development of the roads that are heavily required to boost the competitiveness of this 
emerging country.  
 




As Parcerias Público Privadas tornaram-se num modelo conhecido e utilizado globalmente 
para o desenvolvimento de infraestruturas, especialmente para a construção e operação de 
auto estradas. Uma vez que o sector privado é o responsável pela disponibilidade e qualidade 
das infraestruturas, são esperadas eficiências e inovações que tornam o modelo de PPP mais 
adequado que os contratos públicos tradicionais. Para além disso, as PPP são esperadas a 
evocar contratação baseada no desempenho, regulamentação mais sólida e são também uma 
alternativa de financiamento quando existem restrições fiscais orçamentais. A Quarta Geração 
de Concessões Rodoviárias (4G) é um programa ambicioso das PPP desenvolvido pelo 
governo Colombiano, que visa construir mais de 30 estradas no país nos próximos cinco anos, 
contemplando um investimento de mais de 20 milhões de euros. Esta tese tem como objectivo 
analisar em pormenor a experiência do programa 4G, de forma a avaliar os pontos fortes e 
fracos do modelo Colombiano que poderão vir a desencadear pontos de aprendizagem para 
futuros projetos de PPP em mercados emergentes. Várias conclusões sobre a falta de 
capacidade de financiamento por parceiros privados, barreiras à concessão de empréstimos e 
imaturidade do mercado institucional, juntamente com os riscos específicos e falta de um 
planeamento mais preciso, tornaram evidente a dependência de recursos públicos. Assim, 
coloca-se a questão sobre a conveniência do modelo de PPP bem como a consideração de 
outras alternativas para o desenvolvimento de estradas que constituem requisitos 
fundamentais para reforçar a competitividade deste país emergente. 
	  
Keywords: parcerias público privadas, infraestrutura, auto estradas, Colombia, project 
finance. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Worldwide, the existence of an infrastructure gap is undeniable (Deloitte, 2009). As worrying 
as the lack of infrastructure is in both developed and emerging economies, is the lack of 
public and private investment to close that gap. Intervention of governments is needed to 
ensure that the infrastructure projects developed are in line with the economic and social 
objectives of the country, but a series of market and government failures demand the 
involvement of the private sector, which can contribute with expertise, efficiency and 
innovation. Around the world, PPPs have become a well-known model to deal with the time 
inconsistency problem and other difficulties, always that exists a sufficient transfer of risk to 
the private partners (OECD, 2008).   
 
Colombia, as many other countries in the region, suffers from a high infrastructure gap and 
has an urgent need to consolidate an optimal national road network that connect the 
production and consumption centers of the country, with the main ports and frontiers 
(CONPES, 2013). Despite the fact that total public investment on transportation infrastructure 
has doubled during the last years, Colombia still needs to invest every year for a decade, 3,1% 
of the GDP to close the infrastructure gap (Fedesarrollo, 2012). 
 
The 4th Generation of highways is an ambitious program developed by the Colombian 
government to build more than 30 highways in the country in the next 5 years, which 
contemplates investment of more than EUR 20 billion and is designed under a PPP model. 
The Colombian government is having problems ensuring the financing of the projects that 
have been already approved and is considering different alternatives to construct the 
highways. Some options imply a higher fiscal risk or the possibility of suffering of the same 
problems presented in the previous concessions of highways.  
 
Developing a suitable PPP model is the key to ensure the implementation of the projects 
under the PPP model that the government has been working on during the last 3 years. The 
objective of this paper is to analyze in detail this PPP model, addressing dimensions like the 
institutional framework, the risk assignation and the financial instruments. Then, it is intended 
to assess strengths and weaknesses of the Colombian model that could become on learning 
points for future PPP projects on emerging markets. 
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The paper starts with a review of the relevant literature on PPPs for the purpose of this 
dissertation in Chapter 2. Then, Chapter 3 presents the case of the 4th generation of highways. 
This section covers details about the previous experiences on PPPs in Colombia, the size of the 
projects, the institutional framework, financial model and current state of the program. In 
Chapter 4, the analysis of the 4th generation of highways program is addressed in several 
dimensions like risk management and financial structure, making a special emphasis on each of 
the main financing sources. Finally, in Chapter 5, conclusions and considerations for future 
experiences are provided. 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Infrastructure Development 
 
Around the globe, the existence of an infrastructure “gap” (Deloitte, 2009) is a reality for both 
emerging and developed economies (Haran, 2013). That infrastructure “gap” has gone hand 
by hand with a lack of investment on this field (Meaney & Hope, 2012). Globally, total 
government investment on infrastructure, measured as a proportion over countries’ GDP has 
fell by half, going from 5% to less than 2.5% over the last four decades. On the other side, 
private investment on infrastructure has increased during the same period but the contribution 
of the private sector is not enough to leverage the current state of infrastructure investment 
(Meaney & Hope, 2012). Particularly, during the last years, and due in part to the economic 
downturn, private investment has fallen dramatically, and instead public funding has slightly 
increased. Even so, the medium-term outlook for public infrastructurre finance is bleak. 
(Uppenberg, Strauss & Wagenvoort, 2011). 
 
In the case of infrastructure, leaving the market to act on its own may not end on a socially 
optimal level of investment because there are market failures that make intervention of the 
public sector necessary. On the other side, the government acting on its own drives to other 
failures. Both market and government failures are due, firstly, to the heavy front-loaded sunk 
costs and the long-term nature of infrastructure projects. Besides, the monopolistic 
characteristic of massive infrastructure causes possible incumbents to fear about the return of 
their investment under competition, and entrants to find it too risky to compete due to a 
possible lack of demand or regulation. On the other hand, there are external factors that could 
be positive and will not be captured by the investor, or negative, as pollution and noise, which 
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are socially undesirable1. The difficulty of capturing these externalities impact may lead to a 
suboptimal price on infrastructure investment. (Meaney & Hope, 2012) 
 
In terms of the relations between public and private entities on infrastructure development, the 
monopolistic nature and cost structure of the projects lead to the time-inconsistency problem 
that argues that, from a financial perspective, the investor would need an ex-ante guarantee of 
the recovery of its investments on the long term, considering the incentive for the government 
and regulatory bodies to drive prices down because the assets have partly become a public 
good and operations will run until the operator recovers its marginal cost (Helm, 2009). 
Without a credible commitment, private parties will demand a compensation for the political 
risk, leading to a higher financial cost. (Meaney & Hope, 2012) 
 
In order to close the infrastructure “gap”, the need for infrastructure financing by private 
parties is greater than ever, but it will only works if governments understand and address the 
specific incentives, information problems and risks that arise for investors in infrastructure 
(Uppenberg, Strauss, & Wagenvoort, 2011). In that sense, partnership-based procurement is 
projected to continue raising over the course of the next decade (Haran, 2013).  
 
2.2 Public-Private Partnerships 
	  
Governments need to choose and implement policies that facilitate infrastructure 
development, at the same time allowing access to financing, reducing waste and corruption, 
and developing a sustainable operation framework for the infrastructure assets (Delmon, 
2010). As seen before, PPPs are one of the possible tools to address these challenges. PPPs, as 
defined by the OECD, are agreements between the government and one or more private 
partners in which the latter delivers a service, and in which the alignment of both parties’ 
objectives depends on the sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners (OECD, 2008). It is 
a contract on a long-term base where normally the investment is financed through time by 
deferred payments by the government, user-fees or a combination of both.  
Risk-transfer mechanisms appear with the establishment of an integral regulation over the 
quality of the infrastructure service and accomplishment on the delivery levels (Hinojosa, 
2010). The long-term nature of the PPPs means that they represent a solution to the time-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sarmento illustrates this clearly for the case of roads: “…building a road will reduce the travel time of people 
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inconsistency problem described before, by targeting private sector efficiencies and benefits 
derived from an efficient risk allocation. (Meaney & Hope, 2012). 
 
There are even more tangible expectations about the PPP model: time performance. 
According to Hampton (2012), PPPs are considered the most favorable form of procurement 
in this sense. As several international experiences, mostly in the United Kingdom, have 
shown, PPPs have a higher accomplishment on time and budget than other models, and they 
even evidenced cost savings of up to 10% due to the risk transfer from the public to the 
private firms (Haran, 2013). 
 
One of the main expectations around PPPs is that the private sector will be able to provide 
services more efficiently and more effectively than the public sector, by achieving reductions 
on operating costs and maximizing the use of capital expenditure (Dunnigan and Pollock, 
2003; Shaw, 2004; Meaney & Hope, 2012). Normally, the private sector becomes responsible 
for the initial design and construction, operation and maintenance, thereby aligning incentives 
for low-cost construction and at the same time minimizing lifetime costs of operation 
(Meaney & Hope, 2012).  
 
Additionally, the PPP model is expected to evoke a more entrepreneurial government, 
capturing private sector manners such as market-driven competition, performance-based 
contracting (Bloomfield, 2006) and more solid regulation institutions reducing corruption by 
the increase in accountability and transparency. PPPs would allow accelerated infrastructure 
provision transforming public capital expenditure into a flow of ongoing service payments 
(Liu, Love, Smith, Regan, & Sutrisna, 2014). These expectations follow from the fact that 
shareholders, who are the residual claimants of any additional profits, are expected to put 
pressure on management to accomplish lower costs and major efficiencies (Meaney & Hope, 
2012). 
 
The problem arise when governments choose PPPs as the model for a project based on 
reasons such as having neither revenues nor the credit to finance investments in public goods 
and services such as roads, hospitals or schools. PPPs should not arise on the demand for 
financial miraculous solutions. On the contrary, PPPs should be a feasible solution2 among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Appendix A summarizes a list of considerations that could determine the attractiveness of PPPs.	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other alternatives, and should only be applied when its advantages for the public sector are 
proven by a cost-benefit analysis (Trincão, 2014).  
 
The first step on the decision to adopt PPPs is the political discussion. Governments should 
consider if there is sufficient political and social will to implement PPPs and their 
implications. Another requirement is a deep analysis of the institutional, regulatory and legal 
context to determine if government institutions have the needed skills and resources, if 
financial markets have the capacity and disposition for investment, and if law and regulation 
encourage the development of PPPs. The third step refers to the design elements of the PPP 
structure that include cost/benefit analysis, consideration of different sources of financing, 
commercial agreements needed, suitable participants, and more (Delmon, 2010)3. Figure 1 
presents a framework for building a successful PPP. 
 
Despite the existence of a broad theoretical support for the use of PPPs, it continues to exist a 
lack of comprehensive, reliable data on their performance over the lifetime of the contract. It 
has even been suggested that the absence of clear financial information and accountability 
allows the government to hide mistakes on the development and procurement of the PPP 
projects or to justify decisions already taken (Shaoul, 2010).  
 
2.3 Public Provision vs. PPPs and the PPP Premium  
 
According to some authors, the increase on the development of PPP projects is due mainly to 
the government’s intention of evading the possible constrains on the public budget to 
implement ambitious infrastructure plans (Yescombe, 2011). In addition, some countries face 
a more specific constrain, which are fiscal rules. In that kind of situations, to leverage the 
public budget needed, governments are forced to raise taxes, levy user fees, cut spending in 
other areas, etc. As PPPs do not encumber budgets on the short-term, they become an 
attractive alternative, or maybe the only one, for infrastructure development (OECD, 2008).  
 
Governments find PPPs so attractive because expenditures are only registered after the 
construction is complete and are spread over the years of the contract. On PPPs, governments 
are not obliged to report an increase on expenditures, and undertaking a new project will not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Appendix B proposes a framework for building a successful PPP. 
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affect public debt during the investment stage. In that sense, PPPs can create the false 
impression that they are a more affordable model (OECD, 2008). The reality is that, in the short 
run, PPPs will always tend to reduce the government capital expenditure, but on the long run, 
this may not be the cheapest option. Depending on the social cost of government transfer and 
considering the discount rate used to evaluate the projects, PPPs could be a better alternative or 
not that if the public sector finances the project wholly. After all, it is normally more expensive 
to raise debt on a project finance basis (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). When there are not 
efficiency gains, PPPs and publicly financed projects will have a similar long-run effect on 
public finances. If there is not a change on the net present value of the project, investment is not 
more affordable under PPPs and then, if the government can afford the project under a PPP, it 
should be able to afford it under public provision. (Funke, Irwin & Rial, 2013).  
 
Actually, PPPs use to show higher transaction costs caused by a more careful project 
planning, which, together with the complexity of the contracts, is expected to lower the 
probability of costly renegotiations in the future and to promote that infrastructure will be 
delivered on time and on budget (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). But due to this 
complexity, PPPs can become more expensive. They require legal, technical and financial 
advisory and regulation as well as a tight risk management. These costs can reach up to 10% 
of the total cost of the project (Yescombe, 2007). Due to these transaction costs and risk 
assignation, several authors talk about the existence of a PPP premium. 
 
It is said that investors would require a premium on the return rate of the project with the 
intention of recovering costs sooner. That means that the discount rate would be higher. 
Contracts on PPPs try to mitigate this by providing assurance to investors that they will be 
able to recover their initial cost (Meaney & Hope, 2012). According to Yescombe (2007), the 
cost of capital on a PPP is usually 200-300 points higher than the cost of public funds, but the 
view that PPPs cost more on this sense could be naïve because the cost of capital calculations 
for the government and for private firms are different. For the government, taxpayers assume 
the costs of the risk in the end. This idea rests on capital market imperfections that give the 
government a tax system advantage. On the other hand, private firms have to explicitly 
recognize the risk and its price. At the end, a possible advantage for the government is not 
reflecting the funding risk of the project per se (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). Eduardo 
Engel (2010) argues that a part of the observed PPP premium may be a reflection of faulty 
contract design, and therefore it is not an inherent disadvantage of PPPs.  
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In the end, the evaluation of the best alternative should not depend on the accounting 
methodology or the government’s short-term interests (Trincão, 2014), but on a financial 
evaluation on the affordability of the project. Methodologies like the “Value for Money” and 
the “Public-Private Comparator” (PSC) help on that task but they should be used alongside a 
range of other information (Hinojosa, 2010). The government should take into account that, if 
it does not have the required skills to construct and operate the project, it should develop the 
skilled staff to monitor the private partner and manage the risks that were assigned to it 
(OECD, 2008). 
 
2.4 Project Finance and Financing Sources for PPPs4  
 
The growth and spread experienced by PPPs in different countries is closely linked to the 
development of project finance, a methodology in which investors lend money against the 
cash flow of a structured project. Project finance takes the form of a specially created project 
vehicle (SPV) that carries the construction and operation of the infrastructure (Delmon, 2010). 
In that sense, the assets are specific and illiquid, and so they do not have value in case the 
project does not work (Wilhelm, 2009). The main guarantee investors can have is the right to 
be paid from the cash flow of the project. In that case, three main conditions should be 
accomplished: first, cash flow should be able to offer an attractive profitability for risk 
capital; second, there should be enough cash-flow guarantees, collaterals and insurances that 
give confidence to lenders; and third, the financial planning should be able to separate risks 
and allocate them properly (Hinojosa, 2010). 
 
Project financing typically has two components: equity and debt capital. Payments to 
creditors are contractually defined to be done during the lifetime of the projects, but the cost 
and the revenue for each partner can be different, depending on each contract. The private 
partner could have two sources of revenue to overcome the cost of the investment on the 
infrastructure: payments/subsidies from the public sector that could be direct or contingent 
liabilities, and/or fees paid by the users, like tolls in the road sector (OECD, 2008). As was 
mentioned before, one of the main advantages of PPPs is that with the creation of the SPV, 
expenses are off-balance sheets that will shift the illiquidity risk to the lenders. In that sense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a complete list of financing instruments on PPPs, refer to appendix D. 
	   14	  
lenders would require a detailed assessment of risks and a higher margin than they will ask in 
regular corporate lending. The risk associated to the different obligations will be attached to 
the availability of funding, the cost of funding and the capacity of the project to fulfill the 
debt service obligations (Delmon, 2010, Meaney & Hope, 2012) .   
 
Sources of financing on PPPs change over the time of the project (figure 1). The different 
sources are pretended to match the evolution on risk patterns over the life cycle of the 
infrastructure investment (Yescombe, 2007).  
 















On the first stage, construction, uncertainty is a substantial cause for major design changes 
and costs will depend on the ability of the private partner to build the infrastructure according 
to the studies and plans (Yescombe 2007). The private partner supplies the initial equity of 
the project and normally it should keep this contribution until the end of the project to create a 
long-term incentive (Delmon, 2010). This becomes costly for the private partner because its 
cost of capital is high as it is the last creditor and it is freezing resources that could be 
invested for other purposes (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). Probably, the government 
would require the SPV to include some local investors to accomplish transfer of technology to 
the country or to generate jobs and training for local communities. The SPV may be possibly 
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subjected to public control, for example, through a joint stock company that is common in 
developing countries (Delmon, 2010). 
 
On this stage, private equity is combined with debt that can come from many sources like 
bank loans, export credit agencies, bilateral or multilateral organizations and the government. 
The most common instruments on this stage are bank loans and sometimes government grants 
in money or in kind. In the case of projects that derive their revenues from user fees, the 
initial contribution to investment is sometimes supplemented with subsidies from the 
government (Delmon, 2010).  
 
Over this period, banks will exercise a considerable control over the contracts and private 
partner behaviors (Yescombe, 2007). They perform a strict monitoring that can mitigate the 
moral hazard problem. To exercise control, banks only disburse funds gradually as the project 
stages are completed (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). In the midway between equity and 
debt, there exists the possibility of having mezzanine contributions that have a lower priority 
than senior debt but higher priority than equity contributions. Subordinated loans and 
preference shares are examples of mezzanine contributions. On the other hand, one actor that 
has become important mainly in developing countries is multilateral organizations. These 
agencies will normally demand strict planning and arrangements, and will also help to 
mitigate political risks (Delmon, 2010).5 
 
After completing construction and starting operation, long-term debt appears to substitute 
bank lending, and private partner equity is subjected to a possible acquisition by a facilities 
operator or third-party investors like pension or mutual funds (Wilhelm, 2009). As risk falls 
when works are completed and the events that can affect cash flows are limited, bond 
financing becomes more suitable (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010), and is associated with 
the appearance of rating agencies and insurance companies (Wilhelm, 2009). Bondholders 
only have control over situations that may affect significantly cash flows but they are not able 
to examine the behavior of the private partner or operator (Yescombe, 2007). This type of 
lenders will not want to bear risks that are more appropriately borne by other parties, but they 
will be involved in the financial structuring and will exercise their review powers with the 
support of independent technical and financial auditors (Delmon, 2010). Including debt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For more detail about financing sources on each stage of the Project, refers to appendix C. 
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holders will demand an attractive project bankability, which is ensured if there is a financial 
instrument and a legal bound that give them enough confidence, without requiring direct 
guarantees (Hinojosa, 2010). For example, It has become common for governments to grant 
revenue guarantees to concessionaires, especially when concessions have a fixed term (Engel, 
Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). 
 
Another source of finance at the long run are user-fees. For this, the private operator would 
charge tariffs to the user of the roads. The level at which tariffs are set can be an extremely 
political issue. They can be subsidized, charged at very low rates or not collected (Delmon, 
2010). A critical issue with tariffs is that dependence on user fees becomes unviable when 
large portions of the users lack the ability to pay (Uppenberg, Strauss, & Wagenvoort, 2011).  
 
Anyway, there are different techniques related with tariffs and use of the infrastructure: on 
one side, there are the traditional SPVs where toll collection is the main source of revenue for 
the private partner; and on the other side, there are concessions based on availability where 
the government pays a periodical fee for the availability of the road and maintenance of 
service. It is a fixed payment that is independent of demand; payments are attached to the 
quality of infrastructure, and so there is an incentive for the private partner to promote it. In 
this case, there is a switch of demand risk from the private partner to the government, that at 
the end is covered by tax-payers (Trincão, 2014).  
 
A new mechanism has started to be used in the last decade in countries like Colombia and 
Chile that receives the name of “Less Present Value of Revenues” (LPVR) (Engel, 2008). In 
this technique, there is a periodical monitoring of the income of the SPV and it is upgraded at 
the discount rate defined on the contract. The PPP is over in the moment in which the SPV 
income is equal to the value defined on the contract. In that sense, the partnership does not 
have a fixed term (Hinojosa, 2010).  
 
2.5 Risk Assessment and Allocation on PPPs  
 
Risk refers to an uncertain event that in case of occurring will have a positive or negative 
effect over the objectives, time, costs or quality of the project. Among the most important 
risks on a PPP are technology obsolescence, failures on design, changes on demand, political, 
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regulatory and macro-economic risks (Hinojosa, 2010). Allocation of these risks should be 
made in the most cost effective way, transferring each risk to the party that has better 
capacity, knowledge and experience to deal with it. That way, long-term cost of the project 
can be reduced and incentives are created to deliver the project on time and achieve more 
efficient operations (European Commission, 2003). Adding to that, allocation of risk is the 
main factor that would determine the existence of costly renegotiations in the future (Trincão, 
2014).  
 
Under PPPs, the private sector will be better prepared to take care of endogenous risks, most 
of all commercial risks, leading to technical efficiency. However, the substantial difference 
that makes PPPs more attractive than traditional public provision is the ability to transfer 
demand risk to the private sector (Meaney & Hope, 2012). The assignation of demand risk is 
closely related with the definition of user fees.  
 
It is important to tone that several studies have found that on the project planning, demand is 
normally overestimated. Bain (2009), for example, found that traffic volumes were 23% 
below the forecast. Li and Hensher (2010) found that the real demand was 45% below the 
estimates. Baeza and Vasallo (2008) found that the traffic levels on the long run for Spanish 
roads tend to be 27% below the forecast. Similarly, it has been found that there is a 
systematical tendency to underestimate costs. Mixed with overestimation of demand, this 
results in a high risk around the expected profitability (Meaney & Hope, 2012, Delmon, 
2010). 
 
The transfer of risk from the government to the private sector does not involve reductions in 
the aggregated risk. The difference arises on the financing costs because the private partner 
prices risks explicitly, and not the government. In that sense, PPPs can bring to light the true 
riskiness of the project, which may have been disguised under public provision (Meaney & 
Hope, 2012). 
 
Despite the fact that the private sector may be better at evaluating risks than the public sector, 
in practice not all the projects have enjoyed a better investment appraisal (Meaney & Hope, 
2012). Therefore, a meticulous and structured process of contract design and enforced 
regulation are crucial to ensure a proper risk assessment and assignation.   
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2.6 Contracts and Renegotiations on PPPs  
	  
The existence of uncertainty makes contracts incomplete by definition, opening the possibility 
for conflicts. To solve this, contractual theory incorporates two concepts that are extremely 
important on PPPs: contractual commitment and renegotiations. Under uncertainty there is an 
asymmetry of information as well, that lead to two relevant agency problems: moral hazard 
and adverse selection. The private partner has incentives to show higher costs, avoid ex-ante 
cost savings on financial planning, or even hide information about demand forecast. Contracts 
should be designed in a way that they motivate the private partner to take actions that are 
optimal for him but are optimal on a social perspective at the same time (Hinojosa, 2010). 
 
Figure 2 presents all the contractual relations that emerge on a PPP. Each of these contracts is 
a potential source of conflict. The success of the SPV in dealing with these conflicts, 
according to Engel (2010), depends on two factors. One is the quality of the legal institutions 
and laws on which the web of contracts rests. The governance structure of the procuring 
authority, its degree of independence and the financial condition of the government affect the 
level of risk perceived by creditors. The second factor is how the participants of each 
relationship and contract affect risk perceptions by debt holders. On the side of the private 
partner, for example, its experience, reputation and financial strength are relevant because 
they determine the ability to credibly bear cost overruns without having to renegotiate the 
contract (Engel, Fischer & Galetovic, 2010). 
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One way of overcoming the problems created by uncertainty around future outcomes is to 
build outcome-dependent terms and risk-sharing mechanisms into the contracts. However, 
this can make the contract increasingly complex and lead to transaction costs. There are three 
main transaction costs: first, those costs associated with finding a private sector company 
capable of supplying or operating the infrastructure as required by the public sector, which 
will also include bidding costs for the private sector companies; second, those costs related to 
agreeing the terms and conditions of a contract, including the structure of payments, the 
transfer of risk, and other detailed project specifications; and third, monitoring and 
enforcement costs (Meaney & Hope, 2012). 
 
The incompleteness of contracts can create a high degree of uncertainty and greater risk in 
PPPs, which can in turn push up the cost of capital. It can create an incentive for the private 
partner to take opportunistic actions like engaging in an excessive level of debt and increase 
the risk of financial distress, and then look for renegotiations to ensure the delivery of service 
on the builded infrastrucutre (Meaney & Hope, 2012). Faulty design of the contracts has been 
a huge concern in regions like Latin America and the Caribbean, where renegotiations ocurred 
in more than 55% of the projects on the first three years after signing the contract (Guasch, 
2004).The majority of the requests were made by the private partners and are tipically related 
to increases in tarrifs, delays on investment obligations and reduction of the obligations of the 
private partner with the government (Hinojosa, 2010). 
 
Theoretically, a renegotiation brings advantages for this type of contracts. They are long-term 
contracts, so it is difficult to design complete contracts with all details. Therefore, 
renegotiations in PPP contracts may become occasionally inevitable (OECD, 2007; Posner, 
Ryu & Tkachenko; 2009). In fact, “no contract is flexible enough to cover every eventuality” 
(OECD, 2007). And, on the opposite, an excessively detailed contract may encourage partners 
to look for opportunistic exits instead of making the contractual relation work. The lack of 
flexibility may be a problem if terms under initial contracts are misspecified, which is likely 
in the case where future demand is highly uncertain. For example, the inflexibility of PPPs 
might not allow the parties to take into account exogenous, unexpected cost shocks (Trincão, 
2014). Therefore, there should be a balance between flexibility and strictness (Meaney & 
Hope, 2012).  
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2.7 Institutional Investment on PPPs 
 
Institutional investors have tended to include on their portfolio infrastructure assets, which are 
believed to posses a mix of characteristics in terms of risk return, inflation protection and time 
horizon. These in turn give place to the development of specialized investment products like 
infrastructure funds (Haran, 2013), which can give returns up to 14%, almost double the return 
expected for bonds and stocks in the financial markets (Peng & Newell, 2007). This contradicts 
the common belief that infrastructure investment has a low level of risk, and then only provides 
moderate returns (Bitsch, Buchner & Kaserer; 2010). It has been found too that infrastructure 
investment is not strongly linked to inflation and is not at exponential risk by management 
inexperience (Uppenberg et al., 2011).  
 
Despite the fact that the involvement of institutional investors on infrastructure vehicles has 
grown, it remains below 5% globally and remains underrepresented in the PPP market. This, in 
part, can be attributed to the comparatively small size of PPP projects in institutional investment 
terms. An example of innovation to deal with this is the “unitization” of “securitizes” PPP 
investments in the UK6 that should provide more effective risk-sharing, enables a more diverse 
range of investors to enter the PPP market and enhances the liquidity of the market. Some 
investors feel that this type of financial packages are similar to the ones that generated the 
World Financial Crisis of 2008 and therefore may carry a similar systemic risk (Haran, 2013). 
 
Currently, the composition of international portfolios of PPP projects is confined to a small 
number of specialist investors. This is expected to change over the next few years as the global 
PPP market matures and transparency improves. The global economic crisis has shown the 
overdependence of PPP projects on debt finance. In light of the illiquidity and financial malaise 
within capital, innovative products and models are urgently required to address and attract big 
volumes of private sector capital into infrastructure provision (Haran, 2013). 
 
Additionally, the investment community is willing to be involved in the construction phase of 
projects that deliver higher rates of return in compensation for the greater risk incurred to it. 
There is as well a growing interest of funds to invest in local infrastructure; however, greater 
transparency within infrastructure investment markets is required to enable investors to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Grouping a large number of PPP bonds together into a fund and selling stakes in this fund as “units” (Haran, 
2013). 
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benchmark performance relative to other asset classes and to assess (mitigate) investment risk 
(Haran, 2013). The big question is how to develop a model that capitalizes on private sector 
innovations at the lower cost for taxpayers, while accomplishing the best value of investment 
for the public wealth. In determining the best model, key areas should be taken into 
consideration: flexibility, transaction costs, cost of financing, risk allocation and pricing, and 
incentives for distortion (Meaney & Hope, 2012).  
CHAPTER 3: CASE PRESENTATION 
 
3.1 Past experiences with PPPs in Colombia 
 
Private participation on infrastructure development has been present in Colombia since the 
90s, with the launch of the first generation of highways. Since then, private involvement on 
roads infrastructure has been constant. The first generation of highways, in 1994, included 11 
concession projects for a total of 1.649 km of roads, focusing on specific high traffic roads 
but without any consideration for network effects (CONPES, 2013). In this case, the 
government assumed the demand risk by establishing some guarantees for the private partner 
(Hinojosa, 2010). The second generation in 1995, for the intervention of 470 km, incorporated 
risk and responsibility schemes. This time, a liquidity guarantee was included, and the private 
partner did the acquisition of lands and obtained the environmental permissions at the 
beginning of the construction stage (CONPES, 2013). In that way, public investment 
concentrated on construction, avoiding long-term commitments for the public budget 
(Hinojosa, 2010). The third generation in 2006 was much more ambitious, going for the 
intervention of 3.557 km. In this case there were legislative improvements on the rules of 
renegotiations and additions, as on the selection process and risk assignation, with a specific 
policy framework for the contractual risk management on PPPs (CONPES, 2013). On this 
generation, the present value of revenues was introduced, changing the partnership term from 
fixed to variable. INCO (National Institution for Concessions) was founded to structure and 
manage the projects (Hinojosa, 2010).  
On all the previous generations of highways, there were several over costs on construction, 
problems on land and environmental management, and important delays on the projects’ 
calendars. All of these problems led to multiple renegotiations and eventually to the financial 
imbalance of the projects. The selection process was too long, with lots of conflicts and lawsuits 
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on the assignment process, and absence of homogeneous criteria for the private partner 
selection. Several cases were taken to the court where flaws on the bidding process where 
discovered, including under-budgeted proposals and disequilibrium on contracts on benefit of 
the private company (CONPES, 2013). 
 
The OCDE (2013) analyzed 25 concession contracts in Colombia and found that there were 
around 20 renegotiations by contract, even just one year after being signed, representing 
increases of more than 280% of the initial value of the project. The main reasons were improper 
technical and financial studies, deficient design of contracts and opportunistic behavior by the 
different actors involved on the web of PPP contracts. A deficient contract design makes it 
difficult to solve conflicts on the future and define the contributions to be made by all parties, 
because there is no clear understanding of the economic foundations of the partnership. Besides, 
it was found that the participation of the private partner in relation to the total investment was 
low, implicating an excessive leverage of the project on public financing. Moreover, there was a 
low involvement of institutional investors (CONPES, 2013). 
 
3.2 Institutional Framework  
	  
To tackle the problems from previous experiences and new challenges such as the social-
environmental impact of the projects, the Colombian government has developed several 
initiatives7. The first one was the creation of a complete PPP law. Its most remarkable 
contributions were: first, it demanded more maturity on the technical, environmental, social, 
legal and financial studies, delegating the responsibility of the definitive design to the private 
company. Second, it allowed disbursements done by the government only with the fulfillment 
of the specific agreed levels of availability and quality of the infrastructure and service. Projects 
are divided in functional units (sections) to facilitate financing for each unit independently. 
Third, it specified better criteria to identify and allocate risks to the party that is better prepared 
to deal with them. Finally, It introduced new legal instruments for conflict resolution, such as 
arbitration. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For example, the anti-corruption law to deal with the patronage on the bidding and contracting processes, and 
the infrastructure law to improve the efficiency on lands acquisition, environmental licenses and conflict 
resolution on public services transfer to the SPV (DNP, 2013). 
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An important innovation of the PPP law was the introduction of two different types of PPP 
models. On the first one, PPP under public initiative, the responsible for the initial planning 
and design of the project is the government. Then, a public bidding process is open to find a 
private partner. In this case there is a limit to the possible additions by the public sector of a 
maximum of 20% over the value of the contract. On the second model, PPP under private 
initiative, the private party proposes a project to the government that can or not be accepted, 
and that can or not ends on the proposer being the winning company for the execution. In this 
case, the private partner will finance the project with a maximum contribution by the public 
sector of 20% of the total value of the project8 (CONPES, 2013). 
 
Besides the legislative initiative, the national planning department (DNP) developed The Cities 
System Mission (2012), a plan that defines the specific actions to make cities the growth engine 
of the country, pursuing the regional competitiveness and the citizens’ quality of life, taking 
advantage of urbanization and agglomeration. The National Minister of Transports (NMT) 
introduced The Master Transport Plan 2010-2032, which presented a prioritization of the road 
projects, based on a flow assignation model that identifies bottlenecks on infrastructure and 
traffic and the cost/benefit analysis of the projects to be developed. It included projections of 
demand and capacity analysis. This document concludes that it is necessary to improve 4.800 
km of current roads, to pave 3.500 km and to enlarge 3.200 km from single to dual carriageway. 
 
Finally, organizational changes were introduced in the government structure (figure 3). The 
National Vice-Ministry of Infrastructure was introduced and the old concessions institution was 
replaced by the National Agency for Infrastructure (ANI), a technical body responsible of 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For details of the public and private initiative models, refer to appendix K.  
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3.3 The 4G Highways Projects 
 
In 2013, only 7,20% of the Colombian road network corresponded to dual carriageway and 
around 30% of the roads were under a concession model. They are mainly concentrated on the 
border area of the biggest cities, but the road capacity between the main production and 
consumption centers is small, transportation costs are too high and production centers are not 
specialized (CONPES, 2013). According to the cross-border trade index, developed by the 
magazine Doing Business Global (2013), Colombia decreased 46 positions among 185 
economies, to position #91, in relation to transportation costs and times. According to the World 
Economic Forum (2014), Colombia occupies position #126 among 144 countries on quality of 
road infrastructure, which is lower than the average position of the countries of the Latin 
American region.  
 
Based on the Master Transports Plan and The Cities System Plan, the design and structuration 
of the projects was started, taking into account the financing capacity of the government, the 
fiscal rule and the potential to involve the private sector. Depending on demand and technical 
studies, and considering items like travel time savings, transportation cost savings, the 
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multiplier effect on the economy the new infrastructure may have, and cost/benefit analysis 
overall, the suitability of each project was defined under the PPP model. The complete program 
includes more than 40 highways, when private initiatives are considered, for a total investment 
of more than COP 50 billion and the construction of more than 6.000 km of roads. Appendix E 
presents the outlook of the National Highways Network when the program is completed. For 
detailed information on the projects, refer to appendix F and G. These 19 projects account for 
the development of 3.000 km of roads and a total investment of COP 39 billion, with a CAPEX 
investment of COP 24 billion to be done over the next 5 years, and an OPEX investment of 
COP 15 billion to be executed over a period of 25 years, as it is the planned term of the 
contracts for most of the projects. 
 
3.4 Financial Sources 
	  
The financing structure varies for each of the two stages of the project. On the construction 
stage, the main sources of financing are: local banks (loans), international banks, equity from 
the private partners, institutional investors like private capital funds attracted to invest on this 
stage, and, finally, the multilateral organizations and the National Development Fund (FDN) 
through subordinated debt. (ANIF, 2014) 




On the operation and maintenance stage (O&M), three financing sources are contemplated: 
income based on user-fees, public contributions made by the government, and the resources 
expected from the involvement of pension funds through the acquisition of infrastructure 
bonds. (ANIF, 2014) 
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In the case of Colombia, the approved resources to be disbursed by the government during the 
O&M stage are future obligations and are accounted on the Medium Term Fiscal Plan 
(MTFP)9. They are a pre-assignation of public resources to fulfill strategic plans for the 
economic and social development of the country, which will require to be executed during 
several fiscal periods, like a public transportation system or a long-term education program 
(CCI, 2014). For the period 2015-2044, the amount approved by the government on this 
category is COP 62 billion, with 85% intended to finance transport infrastructure projects, 
which includes airports, trains, roads, ports and public urban transportation systems (ANIF, 
2014). These contributions are intended to cover 60% of the total retributions required to pay 
all the creditors. Besides, according to the PPPs law, the additions by the government cannot 
be higher than the 20% of the estimated cost of the project stipulated on the contract signed at 
the beginning of the partnership. The 40% left of the total retributions are planned to be 
covered by the revenues from user-fees related to the use of the infrastructure over the period 
of the PPP (CNPSE, 2013). 
To facilitate the procurement of resources, the projects are divided into functional units, 
where one unit corresponds to a section of the project with lengths varying from 40 to 70 km, 
which corresponds to an investment need per unit of around COP 100.000 million. That way, 
remuneration is attached to each functional unit according to its availability and fulfillment of 
quality standards, which are subjected to an ongoing evaluation by independent engineer 
firms hired by the ANI. Retributions from the public budget are subjected to possible 
discounts, up to 10% of the agreed value, if the infrastructure does not fulfill all the quality 
standards (DNP, 2014).  
 
3.5 Current State and Issues  
 
The 4G highways program has experienced difficulties to create the synergies and develop the 
expertise in the different public and regulation institutions involved, but the financial dimension 
has become the most matted issue. There is a great concern around long-term financing and the 
possibility to mobilize resources away from institutional investors and risky capital funds. There 
is a general concern about the size of the program, which could be overloading a young market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Ministry of Finance emits the MTFP. It includes estimations of incomes and expenses of the central 
government over the next 10 years and accounts for all the future obligations that have been approved by the 
government (CCI, 2014). For more information, refer to appendix E. 
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like Colombia’s (IDB, 2014).  
 
The projects of the first wave have experienced difficulties to capture all the resources needed 
and the scenario has been even more difficult for the second wave. The main problems 
experienced are: i) banks are refusing to accept payment periods higher than 8-10 years, when 
the intended period is of 20-30 years; ii) investors perceive high risks associated to land 
acquisition, environmental licenses and the acceptance of the projects in local communities; iii) 
cost increases could result from poor technical studies (CCI, 2014). 
 
The Colombian government is considering alternatives to ensure the resources for the projects. 
One of them is to execute some of the highways by traditional public provision. Some of the 
projects are not attractive enough for investors due, in one hand, to the demand risks resulting 
from uncertainty about the future traffic flows and low levels of traffic in the present; and, on 
the other hand, due to the technical complexity and costs of construction, taking into account 
the geological and engineering challenges. This situation is exacerbated by the low investment 
on the pre-bidding stage (0,2% vs. 3% of the value of the project according to international 
standards) (ANIF, 2014).  
 
ANIF (2014) has developed an infrastructure index to determine which projects are more 
suitable for PPPs, which for public provision and which could be executed by any of both 
alternatives. This index is not based on a financial evaluation as the one suggested by the 
Public-Private Comparator, but on five prioritized criteria: current and potential traffic, 
construction risk, investment amount required, relevance of the road, and percentage of the 
work that corresponds to the construction of new assets10 (ANIF, 2014). 
  
Following the ANIF’s recommendation, 13 of 25 evaluated projects would be suitable for 
public provision. This would require additional resources of 0,3% of the GDP per year for the 
next 8 years. With that level of public expense, the deficit goal defined by the fiscal rule would 
not be accomplished. Then, a tributary reform would be needed to collect more taxes that can 
cover the need for public resources. The ANIF suggests to exclude capital expenses from the 
fiscal rule and limit it to debt related with investments, as other countries like Brazil, Ecuador, 
Honk Kong and Japan have done. In that way, there would be a higher contribution for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Refer to appendix I. 
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infrastructure projects at the same time that more taxes are collected. According to the ANIF, 
infrastructure development requires as much attention on the tributary regulation as the PPPs 
themselves (ANIF, 2014). 
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Institutional Readiness 
	  
Colombia is highlighted as one of the most mature countries for the development of 
infrastructure projects, among Chile, Peru, Brazil and Mexico (EIU, 2015). Despite that and 
according to the Infrascope, an infrastructure readiness index developed by the IDB and the 
EIU, the real improvement on the support framework to infrastructure development in the 
country has not been as notable as one would think. There are several areas in which the 
country has not made notable improvements, especially in terms of risk allocation and 
technical expertise on the design and approval of PPP projects.  
 
Figure 5. Colombia on the Infrascope Index. (EIU, 2015) 
 
 
The PPP law, approved in 2012, brought several changes that have been implemented over 
the last 3 years. Table 1 summarizes the most relevant ones. 
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One of the main innovations on the PPP law was the introduction of public and private 
initiatives. To avoid this mechanism becoming an easy way to skip the public tendering 
process, if there are public resources compromised, the public tendering should be open, 
giving the possibility to other parties to gain the right to build the infrastructure if they have a 
better offer than the proponent. 
Another important mechanism to deal with corruption was the timeline created for additions 
and prorogations. With the PPP law, they can only be made on the first three years after 
signing the contract and before 75% of the PPP period has passed. PPP contracts cannot be 
signed at the end of a local government period to avoid the possibility of PPPs being used as a 
political instrument for the next elections. To avoid money laundering, the real benefactor 
information of the private companies should be disclosed, even for the pre-qualification 
process.  
Table 1. Before and after the PPP law. (DNP, 2013) 
Before the PPP Law After the PPP Law 
Payments were done for the work. Payments are done for the infrastructure services. 
Concepts of payment for availability and service 
level are introduced. 
Private partners did not contribute 
with their own capital to the projects. 
Private partners must contribute with their own 
capital to the projects. 
Inefficient allocation of risks. Risk allocation is considered before the selection 
process. 
There were advanced payments made 
by the government. 
Advanced payments by the government are not 
allowed. 
There was place for additions of up to 
60% of the value of the contracts, but 
with renegotiations they could go up 
to 250% of the initial value. 
Additions cannot be of more than 20% of the value 
of the project and it is not subjected to 
renegotiations. 
There was not a strict analysis of the 
alternatives to develop the projects. 
A proper analysis of alternatives (Vfm analysis) is 
required. 
There was not distinction between 
investors and constructors. 
It is required that the private partners count with 
legal and financial capacity, and experience on 
investment and structuration of projects. 
The projects did not count with a 
proper financing design for 
institutional investment. 
Projects should be designed to encourage 
institutional investment on all stages of the project. 
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Despite this improvement, in reality there are lots of challenges to be addressed. Most of the 
personnel of the ANI lack project-planning experience. For example, the law mandates a cost-
benefit analysis for the selection of PPP projects, including public-private comparison 
indicators, but in practice the system has a poor record of renegotiating projects, and 
commercial risks are often passed to the government, irrespective of what has been explicitly 
laid down in contract agreements. In this sense, creating project preparation and oversight 
capabilities within the government remains the critical factor (Infrascope, 2015). 
 
In addition, several difficulties appear in the implementation of the PPP law, like the design 
of the pre-qualification process, which could become a mechanism that favors some private 
companies. Worrying as well is the definition of the level of service and quality standards that 
will allow the disbursement of public funds. It is not an easy task to define that criteria ex-
ante and they can become a manipulated argument to ensure public funding. Another 
important difficulty arises when extensions and additions are truly needed, for example, 
caused by a weather phenomenon. According to the law, the private partner has to pay to the 
government 10% of the required addition in order for the latter to evaluate its authorization. In 
the end, this could cause an increase on the cost of the project, due to the fact that private 
companies are going to add that cost to the initial value; or can imply a decrease on the 
quality of the infrastructure if needed additions are not easy to get. 
Other concerns appear specifically around public contributions to the project. Additions and 
extensions are limited to 20% of the initial value, but it is not clear exactly what is counted as 
public contribution, and if, for example, land rights11 or tolls gave up by the state to the SPV 
are included.  In addition, local governments are allowed to make in-kind contributions out of 
the 20%, but there is no clarity about which kind are these. Appendix I exposes other 
problems in past experiences and the proposed solutions. Some of them were implemented 
but others experienced difficulties persist until now. 
 
4.2 Risk Distribution 
	  
According to the PPP law, risks should be allocated in the contract to whom has better 
capacity to manage and mitigate them (CONPES, 2013). In that sense, there are some risks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Under the PPP law, the government transfers environmental licenses and land acquisition responsibilities to 
the contractors. 
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that are more suitable for the public sector, like political risk, in which legislation or 
regulation of several items can change in the near future and affect the projects, and cannot be 
controlled by the private partner. By contrast, other types of risk related to construction, 
operation and maintenance are better borne by the private partner (Sarmento & Renneboog, 
2014). Finally, there are some risks in which it is not that clear which party is better prepared 
and, as in the Colombian case, an efficient allocation should consider a mix of variables. The 
Colombian government has designed mechanisms in which public contributions for shared 
risks are subjected to some conditions. Table 5 summarizes the mayor risks that have been 
considered and allocation in the 4G highways program. 
  
Table 2. Allocation of Risks on the 4G Highways Program  
(By author, based on CONPES, 2013; ANI, 2014) 
Type of risk Description Allocation 
Lands Delays on availability of land due to land management 
Private 
Over costs on acquisition and compensations for land Shared 
Environmental 
Delays on procurement of licenses Shared 
Over costs on environmental compensations (due to biodiversity 
loss, use of natural resources or resettlement plans) 
Shared 
Additional works required by the environmental authority that are 




Delays on social consultancy processes Shared 
Invasion of the road right of the concession Public 
Network Relocation of current tolls or impossibility of locating new tolls 
Public 
Over costs due to network interference Shared 
Design Over costs due to problems on studies and design 
Private 
Over costs in design due to ANI's decisions Public 
Construction 
Over costs due to a bigger larger amount of works Private 
Over costs due to a bigger larger amount of works in long tunnels 
with geological risk 
Shared 
Variations on input prices Private 
Operation and 
Maintenance 
Over costs due to a bigger larger amount of infrastructure Private 
Variations on input prices Private 
Commercial / 
Demand 
Lower revenues due to a decrease in toll collection (in terms of 
NPV) 
Public 
Lower revenues due to a decrease in toll collection (in terms of 
liquidity) 
Shared 
Lower revenues due to evasion of toll payments Private 
Lower revenues due to elution of toll payments Public 
Financial Disposition of equity and debt resources Private 
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Type of risk Description Allocation 
Disturbance on the financing commitments acquired due to 
changes of market variables or project conditions 
Private 




Compensations due to new differential tariffs Public 
Over costs due to the implementation of new technologies on toll 
collection mechanisms 
Private 
Tributary changes Shared 
Normative changes, except tributary Private 
Normative changes on technical specifications Public 
Force Majeure 
Idle costs related with the permanence of the infrastructure Public 
Insurable events Private 
Non-insurable events Public 
 
Land risk is associated with the acquisition of lands and the cost of socioeconomic 
compensation for landowners that arise from the negotiation or expropriation processes. 
Specifically, for the compensations, there is a partial guarantee given by the ANI and covered 
by the contingencies fund designated by the government. The same applies for the social 
compensations that arise from the environmental externalities generated by the projects, such 
as biodiversity loss and the cost that could result from the interference of other networks such 
as telecommunications and water. In all these cases, the partial guarantee given by the 
government is subjected to certain conditions: if compensations or over costs correspond to a 
value between 100% and 120% of the initial value of the infrastructure, it is assumed by the 
SPV. If the cost is between 120% and 200%, the guarantee will cover 70% of that. Finally, if 
it goes above 200%, the cost will be entirely beat by the public sector. There is a specific 
guarantee related to the construction of long tunnels because they carry a high geographical 
uncertainty despite the accuracy of technical studies (CONPES, 2013). 
	  
According to several authors, demand risks should be allocated to the private sector, which 
would require extra effort and efficiency from it (Chung, Hensher, & Rose, 2010; Sarmento, 
2014). Normally, the private sector is better on calculating demand and fulfilling commercial 
tasks. Despite this argument, in reality demand risk is allocated to the public or private party, 
depending on the revenue design of the PPP, due most of all to the uncertainty or inadequacy 
of the forecasted demand. Political, social or environmental factors can be considered as well 
in the decision (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014).	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In the 4G highways program, commercial risk12 is subjected to the traffic forecast, which 
depends at the same time of macroeconomic variables and is attached to the regional 
development. All of these are exogenous variables that cannot be controlled by the 
concession. Then, the public sector is the party mainly responsible for commercial risks, with 
the exception of decreases in revenues related with evasion of toll payments (where the 
private party is responsible for implementing an effective collection system) and illiquidity 
derived from poor concession management. In the Colombian case, there are not alternative 
roads for most of the cases and there is a stable, consistent demand for roads that are crucial 
for regional and national connectivity. Although there is not evidence of a direct consideration 
of this fact on risk allocation, the LPVR should reflect the resulting advantage. The difference 
between expected and real revenues of the project would be measured periodically. If the 
negative difference is related to deviations on traffic projections, there is place for 
compensations from the public contingency fund. 
	  
Force majeure risks could be important in the Colombian case, due to the magnitude, 
complexity and uncertainty around the projects. Another innovation was introduced for this 
kind of risk: compensation by the public sector only applies for functional units where there is 
already an 80% or more progress in the construction of complex works such as tunnels less 
than 2 km long, and 40% for tunnels above this mark. A limit of two years to solve the 
problems that arise from the force majeure event is established as well. Compensation should 
be proportional to the initial value of the functional unit under revision and be subjected to 
deductions to promote problem-solving initiative by the concessionaire.  
 
4.3 Financing Sources and Financing Model 
	  
Figure 6 summarizes the sources of financing and the compromises along all the involved 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the design of the PPPs of the 4G highways program there is not a clear distinction of demand risk, being 
commercial risk the concept used instead. There is an intention of the legislator to encompass all the situations 
that can have as a consequence a failure to collect the expected revenues coming from the use of the 
infrastructure. Commercial risk is defined as the deviation between the expected and real present value of toll 
collection. 
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Next, this paper addresses several challenges and difficulties that have arisen for each of the 
financing sources on the 4G highways program. 
 
I. Equity and Bank Loans. 
 
It is expected that the equity contribution from the private partners sums up a total of COP 10 
billion, which represents 20% of the total investment of the 4G highways program. Until now, 
Colombian construction companies have the majority on the allocation of projects, holding 69% 
of the contracts by value13 (BI, 2014). Despite the fact that Colombian firms show less debt than 
their international competitors, they are much smaller firms that may not have enough financial 
capacity to deal with the project costs and risks, mainly due to possible illiquidity.  
 
According to the information published by Business Intelligence  (2014), revenues in 2013 from 
the Spanish companies bidding is more than 3 times the revenues of each of the Colombian 
companies that have been awarded the projects. In the whole comparison, Spanish companies 
are better as well on assets management, where they are more efficient in turning their assets 
into revenues. Even so, Colombian firms have a strong debt position where liabilities-to-asset 
ratios tend to be lower than for Spanish companies. This could give room for maneuvering, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Appendix J exhibits several graphics with comparisons of financial ratios and shares of different companies. 
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whether that means taking more debt or creating a cushion in case of losses (BI, 2015).  
 
Definitely, financial capacity is not the reason why Colombian companies have been at the 
front, but their knowledge and comfort working in the Colombian environment and dealing with 
the specific geographic characteristics of terrains. Sadly, two problems arise with this situation. 
First, Colombian companies will not be able to apply for the rest of the projects coming out 
because they are at the limit of their financial capacity. Mario Huertas & Co, the Colombian 
concessionaire that has obtained the highest portion of the bidden projects, with 29% by value, 
has already put in sale part of its share of the projects, leading negotiations with companies like 
Goldman Sachs (Revista Dinero, 2015). Second, the monopoly of Colombian firms can 
discourage international players to bid again. Colombian companies are not even able to ensure 
the equity contribution that could probably be filled by international applicants. 
 
 
Looking in detail at the case of Mario Huertas, several new partners have been included on the 
SPV, splitting the financing needs between all the parties that account for shares between 10% 
and 20%. Some of the new partners have been chosen because they have expertise on certain 
roads or type of construction. The inclusion of financing partners like Goldman Sachs could 
give positive signals to banks and debt funds. The equity contribution that firms like Mario 
Huertas & Co are available to make is not greater tan 25%, meaning that they are appealing to 
other sources to fulfill their quota. Other alternatives such as entering the capital market as a 
public company are on the table, but they require more time than the expected to start the 
construction of the projects (Revista Dinero, 2015). 
 
To deal with the lower contributions of equity from the bidders, the Colombian government 
has worked in several debt fronts that include expected contributions of COP 17.4 billion 
from local banks, COP 2.5 billion in debt funds, COP 7.8 billion from foreign partners 
(banks) and COP 3.5 billion from FDN (BI, 2015). Local banks are willing to support the 
projects but are not open to consider financing terms longer than 10 years. For local banks, 
betting on the 4G highways program is not an easy consideration since current infrastructure 
bank debt in Colombia is COP 8 billion and they are expected to grant loans for more than 
double that sum, in a project financing model in which there are not specific assets or 
guarantees of recovering the money (Revista Semana, 2015). On the other hand, foreign 
banks may be doubtful to enter the Colombian market due to the political and economic risk 
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they may perceive in the country. Finally, the FDN does not count, for now, with the 
resources mentioned. They are expected to come from privatization of some public companies 
but there have been several problems with that and a lack of support from the population.  
 
II. Public Contributions 
 
The introduction of the FDN was one of the main institutional innovations. Figure 7 exposes 
the FDN working fronts, as an advisory and investment public body. 
 
Figure 7. FDN working fronts. (DPN, 2015) 
 
 
On the short term, the main public sources of resources for the projects are the FDN 
contributions, where the multilateral organizations account for 30% share of the entity. The 
FDN would grant subordinated loans and liquidity guarantees, and at the same time could 
finance the structuration of projects and advice regional governmental entities. Introducing a 
10% subordinated debt over the total value of the 4G highways program is expected to change 
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The government designed a special legal framework that allows the FDN to give financing and 
guarantees above the limits established for other credit entities, as long as the project is not 
directly financed with resources from tax-payers. According to international standards, laws and 
regulations, credit entities should establish prudential limits for big clients or group of clients 
that imply high risk, and more when there are several groups of clients for which there exists a 
bundled effect. Those limits should be based on the financial self-reliance and legal 
independence of credit holders. In most of the countries, the limits to grant credits are between 
10% and 40% of the credit entity equity. A limit below 10% is not realistic with market needs, 
but more than 25% can generate a perception of a relaxed supervision.  
 
Currently, the equity of the FDN is of about COP 500.000 million, with a limit to credits of 
10%, which means that the entity can grant credits for only COP 50.000 million. This amount 
corresponds to 1% of what is expected to be contributed from multilateral organizations on the 
4G highways program. The available resources from the FDN are less than insufficient.  In that 
sense, FDN would not be able to give the guarantees that are needed as a backup for the loans 
that are being demanded from local banks. The lack of equity contributions, insufficiency of 
FDN resources, and prevention from banks to grant loans under a project financing model for 
such huge amounts of money has complicated the financing of the construction stage.  
 
On the long term, there are two sources of financing: the contingencies fund that would cover 
over cost or extra resources needed due to risk occurrence, conflicts between the parties or 
unexpected situations; and future obligations that are one of the two main retribution sources to 
	   38	  
the SPV. The flow of future obligations has been designed according to the medium-term fiscal 
framework, which defined as maximum coupon for investments in PPPs the next values: 0,05% 
of PIB for 2015, 0,10% for 2016, 0,35% for 2017-2019 and 0,4% between 2020 and 2044 
(CNPSE, 2013). 
 
As figure 9 shows, the total coupon allocated for transportation projects on the period 2015-
2043 is already full with the two current waves of projects of the 4G highways program and is 
still missing the 3rd wave. As was pointed out by the ANIF (2014), there is no extra fiscal space 
on future obligations for the 4G highways program under the current fiscal rule. Then, two 
different fronts can be addressed: collecting more taxes and modifying the fiscal rule to give 
more space to extra budget from the public treasure. 
 
Figure 9. Allocation of future obligations for PPP projects (DNP, 2013) 
 
 
III. User-Fee Based Income 
 
An optimal pricing on tolls could reduce the need to use tax revenues from other sources for the 
financing of roads. This may improve efficiency further, because these other taxes are often 
distortionary. It may also help in overcoming problems of public acceptability of road pricing. 
The resulting scheme is likely to be perceived as fair, since only the users of a road pay for its 
availability, and transparent, since there are not hidden transfers surrounding the financing of 
roads (Newberry, 1989). User-fees in the Colombian case are categorized by type of vehicles. 
Prices for tolls could be a significant socioeconomic problem in Colombia since most of the 
population does not count with a high enough income and there are not alternative suitable 
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roads for local and regional mobility. In that sense, the optimal financing approach cannot be 
made independently of an analysis of the population’s ability to pay (Uppenberg et al., 2011). 
 
Toll collection in the 4G highways program is expected to generate resources not only for O&M 
but to cover part of the retributions of the complete PPP. Appendix K shows the retributions 
expected for each project in terms of public contributions and user-fees, which represent around 
45% of the total. Retributions account in average for 263% of the investment value with return 
rates that go from 80% to even 234% in some cases. There is a huge disparity on road lengths, 
types of construction interventions, number of functional units and CAPEX investment, and in 
that sense, a huge disparity on investment and retributions values.  
 
IV. Institutional Investment 
	  
The Colombian government has worked over the last two years making the institutional 
arrangements for infrastructure bonds emission. It is expected that the pension funds can 
contribute through this mechanism with 10% of their savings, which go up to COP 250 
billion, meaning additional funding for the 4G highways program of around COP 25 billion. 
The emission of these bonds is subjected to the completion of each functional unit with the 
intention of lowering the overall financial risk. According to the World Bank (2012), the 
investment portfolio of pension funds in Colombia is composed by 44% of public debt, 8% of 
private debt titles, 31% share on owned investments and 17% on international investments. 
There is no record of investments on securitized asset titles such as infrastructure bonds. 
	  
On the literature there are several arguments in favor of institutional investment on 
infrastructure, such as the enhancement of the country’s international competitiveness, the 
development of local capital markets and the long-term match of infrastructure assets and 
pension liabilities. Infrastructure investment is much more tangible than other complex 
financial products, and expected returns are attractive enough, with an annualized return rate 
of 9,5%, in second place after private equity investments14.  There are arguments against it as 
well, such as a possible misallocation of resources, political interventionism, and agency 
problems and, most of all, corruption, which can arise with incentives generated on tax 
advantages or guarantees. Infrastructure can be an integral element of the assets portfolio of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For more details of returns on different asset classes, refer to appendix O. 
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institutional investors but it would require high standards of governance, risk management 
and supervision inside pension funds management companies (Inderst, 2009). 
 
On the international experience on infrastructure bonds, several difficulties have appeared: 
first, the lack of knowledge and experience from managers and advisers on the design of these 
instruments; second, the shortage of information and data to measure the risk profile and 
performance of infrastructure bonds; and finally, the lack of experience of pension funds on 
asset classes and private equity investments (Inderst, 2009).  
The huge effort to attract institutional investment for the 4G program is conditioned by the 
guarantees that the government could give to pension funds. It is the FDN responsibility to 
give that guarantees and leverage public resources to put the infrastructure bonds on the 
market. As showed before, the FDN does not count with the needed resources and the 
government was expecting to capitalize the entity through the sale of ISAGEN, the biggest 
public energy company in Colombia. On may 2015, the State Council stopped the selling 
process, due to a demand on course that argued about the inconvenience for the public interest 
due to a loss of value on the long run over the assets and incomes of the State. The 
government has insisted on the benefits on the sale of ISAGEN, but the truth is that is a 
promising profitable company and the return over the 4G program counts with a complex risk 
profile and considerable uncertainty. With that, the FDN would not receive around 5.5 COP 
billion, which were supposed to leverage more than 20 COP billion in bonds.  
 
This situation has put in evidence several difficulties and weakness of the PPP model 
developed for the 4G Highways Program: first, it has exposed the dependency of the PPPs on 
public contributions, despite the fact that PPPs are supposed to allow the government to relax 
the financing requirement to develop the projects. Second, it could put en evidence that the 
PPP model has not been chosen for being the most sustainable option but for the short-term 
convenience of linking the private sector. Third, it shows the political dimensions that was 
discusses before on this paper in which there is still a lack of institutional agreement on the 
projects. Finally, it can highlight the possible oversizing on the 4G program. To this point, 
seems that the government has limited options, but this could be a call to redefine incentives 
and put higher responsibility on the private sector, financial institutions and institutional 
investors to get involved on the projects and exercise the control and inspection needed.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The analysis of the Colombian case has pointed out critical points on the design and preparation 
of PPPs for the development of massive infrastructure projects. It highlighted the importance of 
the political discussion and the need of reaching sufficient politician and social will for 
implementation and implications’ acceptance by different stakeholders. Besides, it exposed the 
fragility and dependency of financing sources over public contributions and guarantees, when 
financial capacity by the private sector is insufficient and financial sector is not willing to 
assume considerable risk. Overall, it highlighted the importance of considering several 
alternatives for infrastructure development, as ANIF well suggested, and bet to PPPs for being a 
feasible solution and not based on reasons such as fiscal budgetary constrains or to justify 
decisions already taken.  In addition, the Colombian case bring into the discussion the 
importance of developing the institutional readiness and expertise to monitor private partner 
behavior and manage the risk that were assigned to both parties. Moreover, the current 
difficulties experienced by the Colombian government with the prohibition to sale ISAGEN, 
highlight how the participants of the PPP can affect risk perception, as well as the degree of 
independent and financial condition of the government structure. 
 
In term of risks management, the 4G program exposes the complexity of risk assessment and 
allocation, which increase when specific geographical, environmental, network and land risks 
are taken into account. Specially, referring to demand risk, it discloses the dependence of the 
project sustainability on demand forecast. The LPVR is a promising alternative to ensure the 
alignment between both parties’ incentives since the private partner is obtaining the promised 
retribution and the impact of the projects over the public budget can be damped. 
 
In relation to financing sources, several problems are identified: the lack of capacity of the 
selected companies, the lack of founding by government agencies and the dependency carried 
for investment guarantees, the poorness of banks involvement and the possible over dimension 
of the program. As the Colombian highways projects promise an attractive return rate, better job 
can be done in terms of risk allocation, putting higher responsibility on private parties and 
financial sector to finance the roads. Giving a higher weight to the revenues from user-fees or 
reducing the fiscal restriction for additional public debt are alternatives too, considering always 
that the risk associated to the different future obligations will be attached to the availability and 
cost of funding, and the capacity of the project to generate future cash-flows.  
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix A. Attractiveness of PPPs 
 
Attractiveness of PPPs (Akintoye, 2005; Hinojosa, 2010) 
Expected positive effects Possible negative effects 
Risk transfer to the private sector Lack of experience and knowledge of 
the private sector to manage public 
projects 
Maximum price for service costs Excess on restrictions and conditions 
Reduction of operation costs for the 
public sector 
Increases on user fees 
Reduction of financial costs for 
capital investments 
Excessive risk transfer to the private 
sector 
Overcoming of public budgetary 
constrain 
Lack of fulfillment of the government 
objectives 
Reduction of total cost of the project Possible increase on the total cost of 
the project 
Acceleration on the project timeline Delays on the project timeline due to 
political situations 
Improvements on the construction 
process 
Extensive and costly negotiations 
Improvements on the quality of work Reduction on the accountability of the 
project 
Incentives for innovation  
 
Appendix B. Framework for building successful PPPs 
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Appendix C. PPP financing and structure 
 
PPP finance during the construction stage. (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014) 
 
 
A typical PPP structure (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2014) 
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Appendix D. Financial instruments used in PPP road projects 
 
Financial instruments used in PPP road projects (World Bank, 1999) 
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Appendix E. Colombian National Roads Network 
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Appendix F. Financial details of the projects 
 
Values for approved projects by April 2015 (4th Generation of Highways, Colombia) 
 
Sources: DNP, 2013; ANI, 2013; DNP, 2014; ANI, 2014. 
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Appendix H. Future Obligations of the Central Government, Colombia. 
 
 
Source: CCI, 2013. 
 
 




Source: ANIF, 2014. 
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Appendix J. Evolution of the Infrascope Index 
 
 
Source: EIU, 2015. 
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Source:	  DNP,	  2014.	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Appendix L.  Problems and solutions on the Colombian PPPs in the past 
 














Problems in Past Experiences Implemented Solutions 
• Uncertainty 
• Wrong estimations 
• Improper risk allocation 
• Cost increases and renegotiations 
Technical studies and design should be in 
an advanced stage of development before 
signing the contract, eliminating the 
possibility of substantially modifying the 
design. 
• Lack of a proper due diligence on the 
projects. 
• Insurances and guarantees that are 
difficult to collect by the beneficiary. 
• Insufficient guarantees. 
Insurances and guarantees can only be 
emitted by renowned insurance companies 
with high ratios of capital and coverage. 
• Non-completion of the projects. 
• Delays on construction. 
• Embezzlement of public resources. 
Implementation of payments for availability 
and quality of the infrastructure. 
• Insufficient funding. 
• Embezzlement of public resources. 
The SPV is obligated to manage resources 
using an independent trust fund. 
• Insufficient time to structure the 
proposals. 
Establishment of a time period that is 
technically defined as the time needed by 
the proposers to develop all the activities 
that the development of the proposal 
requires. 
• Good proposals are eliminated because 
they do not fulfill some minor required 
formalities. 
Establishment of a difference between 
fulfillment of criteria and accreditation with 
the latter not being a reason to eliminate a 
proposal, giving to the proposers the 
possibility of getting all the required 
accreditations if the proposal is to be 
considered.  
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Problems not solved and difficulties on Colombian PPPs in the past (Fedesarrollo, 2012) 
  
Problems in Past 
Experiences 






Additional guarantees by 
the SPV to investors in case 
of failing in doing the 
private contributions to the 
project on the amount and 
the moment that was 
promised. The private 
partner should contribute 
around 30% of the 
investment needed. 
Private partners lack resources from 
the beginning, so there is no guarantee 
that can protect investors in that case. 
Multiple construction companies are 
doing partnerships to apply for the 
projects and demonstrate enough 
financial capacity, but they cannot 





• Moral hazard 
problems 
Adjudge the project to the 
proponent that ensures the 
less economic value: who 
pays more to the 
government or requires 
fewer resources. 
A selection based on the less economic 
value gives incentives to manipulate 
proposals for the best offer. There are 
other criteria that are important to 
ensure that the project is delivering the 
best socio-economic value.  
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Appendix N. Costs and retribution for the 4G program. 
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Appendix O. Return over infrastructure investment 
	  
Infrastructure Risk-adjusted Performance Analysis 1995-2006 (Peng/Newell, 2007) 
	  
	  
Expected Returns and Correlation of different asset investments (Morgan Stanley, 2007) 
	  
